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Substantial research in the psychology of expertise has shown that experts in several fields (e.g., science, math-
ematics) performbetter than non-experts on standardized tests of intelligence. This evidence suggests that intel-
ligence plays an important role in the acquisition of expertise. However, a counter argument is that the difference
between experts and non-experts is not due to individuals' traits but to academic selection processes. For in-
stance, in science, high scores on standardized tests (e.g., SAT and then GRE) are needed to be admitted to a uni-
versity program for training. Thus, the “academic selection process” hypothesis is that expert vs. non-expert
differences in cognitive ability reflect ability-related differences in access to training opportunities. To test this
hypothesis, we focused on a domain in which there are no selection processes based on test scores: chess. This
meta-analysis revealed that chess players outperformed non-chess players in intelligence-related skills (d =
0.49). Therefore, this outcome does not corroborate the academic selection process argument, and consequently,
supports the idea that access to training alone cannot explain expert performance.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
Whether intelligence plays a significant role in determining expert
performance has been intensely debated for more than a century.
Starting with Galton's (1869) theory of hereditary genius, the idea
that expert performance needs intelligence, and hence, that experts
are on averagemore intelligent than laypeople, has received substantial
support. Barron (1963) suggested that in some areas, such as physics
and mathematics, the minimum threshold to achieve graduation is an
IQ of 120. More recently, a longitudinal study showed that SAT scores
of gifted children at the age of 13 predicted future success (e.g., number
of scientific publications and patents) in their respective fields
(Lubinski, 2009; Robertson, Smeets, Lubinski, & Benbow, 2010). Finally,
in a meta-analytic review, Hunter and Hunter (1984) reported a strong
positive correlation (r=0.53) between job performance and general in-
telligence (g). Moreover, the strength of this relationship was positively
related to job complexity. These results were confirmed in successive
meta-analyses (Hunter, Schmidt, & Le, 2006; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998;
Schmidt, Shaffer, & Oh, 2008).
Ericsson (2014) has recently offered a competing view of expertise in
which he argues that the difference in cognitive ability between experts
and non-expertsmay be due to academic selection processes. Admission
into undergraduate and postgraduate education programs is often based
on test scores correlating with general intelligence measures (e.g., SAT
for undergraduate studies, GRE for graduate studies, LSAT for law
school). Therefore, Ericsson (2014) claims that if experts—such as scien-
tists or musicians—score better on intelligence tests than non-experts,
thismay only be because individualswith higher cognitive ability had ac-
cess to the training that made them experts.
Both views recognize the evidence that experts tend to have greater
cognitive ability than their non-expert counterparts in many fields.
However, they differ in what is assumed to account for the relationship
between expertise and cognitive ability. The traditional view holds that
cognitive ability is directly predictive of expertise. That is, experts have
greater cognitive ability than non-experts because cognitive ability ac-
counts for some of the variance in performance. The competing view
(Ericsson, 2014) holds that cognitive ability predicts access to training,
which in turn predicts expertise. That is, according to this view, experts
have greater cognitive ability than non-experts because those with
greater cognitive ability were selected for training; cognitive ability is
not directly predictive of expert performance.
To test these competing views, we chose a field—chess—in which
there is no selection process that limits access to training. According to
the academic selection process hypothesis (Ericsson, 2014), if there
are no barriers to training based on cognitive ability, then there should
be no difference in cognitive ability between chess players who are
training in this area of expertise and non-chess players who are not en-
gaged in training.
1.1. Chess and expertise
Thanks to a reliable indicator of players' strength (Elo rating; Elo,
1978) and a balance between tactical calculation and strategic thinking
(Hambrick et al., 2014), chess is widely considered an archetypical do-
main for the study of expertise, i.e., the ability to perform better than
the majority of people in a particular domain (Gobet, 2016). In fact, to
emphasize the idea that chess is an ideal model environment for re-
search in the psychology of expertise, Simon and Chase (1973) indicat-
ed that the role chess plays in cognitive science is comparable to that of
Drosophila (i.e., fruit fly) for the field of genetics.
Chess is also an excellent model environment to investigate the im-
portance of cognitive ability and deliberate practice––the engagement
in specific structured activities designed to improve performance in a
field––in the acquisition of expertise (Gobet, 2016; Gobet, De Voogt, &
Retschitzki, 2004; Grabner, 2014). Achieving mastery in chess requires
intensive practice, but other factors seem to play an important role,
too. For example, Campitelli and Gobet (2011) found that the amount
of deliberate practice necessary to reach expertise in chess varied
massively between players, suggesting that deliberate practice
alone cannot explain individual differences in expert performance
in chess. Since chess is a complex and intellectual activity, general in-
telligence and more specific cognitive abilities—such as visuospatial
ability, short-term and working memory, planning, processing
speed, and problem-solving skills—have been considered as poten-
tial predictors of individual differences in chess skill (Bilalić,
McLeod, & Gobet, 2007; Burgoyne et al., 2016; de Bruin, Kok,
Leppink, & Camp, 2014; Frydman & Lynn, 1992; Jastrzembski,
Charness, & Vasyukova, 2006; Schneider, Gruber, Gold, & Opwis,
1993; Waters, Gobet, & Leyden, 2002).
Unlike other fields of expertise, access to chess practice and instruc-
tion does not depend on performance on standardized tests. That is,
chess is an activity open to many people without restriction. Joining a
chess club does not require any preliminary testing, and participation
in courses and tournaments is often open to players of any level and rel-
atively affordable. Certainly, a few chess players are funded by chess
federations and admitted to elite tournaments, but the selection is al-
ways based mainly (if not completely) on players' chess performance.
Chess is thus an ideal domain to test Ericsson's (2014) argument that
differences in cognitive ability between experts and non-experts are
due to performance on standardized tests limiting access to the domain,
given that no such limitation applies to the field of chess.
1.2. Purpose of the present study
To test the academic selection hypothesis, we investigated whether
cognitive ability differences emerge between those who have entered a
field and those who have not in a field where there is no selection test:
chess.We conducted ameta-analysis across all the studiesmeeting our in-
clusion criteria that measured cognitive ability. This meta-analysis exam-
ines studies of natural groups—those who have chosen to enter the field
and those who have not2—and thus our results cannot address the causal
structure of a relationship between chess player status and overall cogni-
tive ability. However, finding a relationshipwould support the notion that
2 For an analysis of the correlation between chess skill and intelligence in chess players
of different skill levels, see Burgoyne et al. (2016).
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cognitive ability is a strong candidate factor to play a role in expert perfor-
mance and that expert vs. non-expert differences in cognitive ability can-
not be assumed to only be due to academic selection processes.
2. Method
We designed the random-effects meta-analysis and report the re-
sults in accordance with the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic
Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) statement (Moher, Liberati,
Tetzlaff, & Altman, 2009). The entire procedure is summarized in Fig. 1.
2.1. Literature search
A systematic search strategy was used to find the relevant studies.
Google Scholar, ERIC, Psyc-Info, JSTOR, Scopus, and ProQuest Disserta-
tions & Theses databases were searched to identify potentially relevant
studies.We used two specific combinations of keywords: (a) chess AND
Fig. 1. Flow diagram of the studies included in the meta-analysis.
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(intelligence ORmemory OR planning OR cognitive OR ability); and (b)
(chess OR Elo ORDWZOR Fide) AND (intelligenceORmemory OR plan-
ning OR cognitive OR ability). In addition, previous narrative reviews
were examined, andwe e-mailed (n=7) researchers in the field asking
for unpublished studies and data.
2.2. Inclusion criteria
To be included in our meta-analysis the study needed to:
1. report a comparison between chess players and non-chess players;3
2. include at least one measure of intelligence;4 and
3. report an effect size or the authors needed to provide enough infor-
mation to calculate an effect size.
We found seven studies, conducted between 1987 andApril, 1, 2016,
thatmet all the inclusion criteria. These studies included seven indepen-
dent samples and 19 effect sizes,5 with a total of 485 participants.
2.3. Description of the included studies (Table 1)
2.3.1. Anderson (2004)
In this study, chess players (n=80) and non-chess players (n=46),
aged 11–14 years, were administered the d2 Test of Attention
(Brickenkamp & Zillmer, 1998). This test measures processing speed and
discrimination of similar visual stimuli. Nomeasure of chess skill was pro-
vided because the chess players, probably due to their young age, did not
have an Elo rating (or equivalent). The participantswere from twomiddle
schools with open chess courses to their students. The chess players were
those who had selected to enroll in a chess course. The chess players and
non-chess players were matched on age and years of education.
2.3.2. Campitelli and Labollita (2016)
In this study, chess players (n=25) and non-chess players (n=25),
aged 15–55 years, were administered the Tower of London (a measure
of planning ability; Shallice, 1982) and the Cognitive Reflection Test
(Campitelli & Gerrans, 2014). According to a commonly acceptedmetric
(Elo N 2000; see Gobet & Simon, 2000), all the chess players can be con-
sidered chess experts, and the sample included some international
grandmasters (Elo N 2500). The chess players and non-chess players
were matched on age and level of education.6
2.3.3. Doll and Mayr (1987)
In this study, chess players (n=27) and non-chess players (n=88),
aged 18–51 years, were administered the Berlin Intelligence Structure
(BIS; Jäger, 1982), a test of general intelligence. The BIS consists of
seven subscales measuring three content-related skills (verbal, numer-
ical, and figural) and four operational skills (processing speed, memory,
creativity, and information processing capacity). All the chess players in
the samplewere titled players (Masters, FideMasters, and International
Masters). The chess players and non-chess players were matched on
age.
2.3.4. Hänggi, Brütsch, Siegel, and Jäncke (2014)
In this study, chess players (n=20) and non-chess players (n=20),
aged 19–41 years, were administered the Raven's Advanced Progressive
Matrices (Raven, 1998), a mental rotation task (Peters et al., 1995), and
a block-tapping test (a measure of visuospatial short-term memory;
Schellig, 1997). The chess players were all experts, and there were sev-
eral international grandmasters (Elo N 2500). The two groups were
matched on age and level of education.
2.3.5. Unterrainer, Kaller, Halsband, and Rahm (2006)
In this study, chess players (n=25) and non-chess players (n=25),
mean age 29.3 years, were administered the Tower of London, the Stan-
dard Progressive Matrices (Raven, 1960), the digit span test, and the
Corsi block-tapping test (Milner, 1971). Chess rating ranged from
1250 to 2100 (amateurs, intermediates, and experts). The chess players
and non-chess players were matched on age and level of education.
2.3.6. Unterrainer, Kaller, Leonhart, and Rahm (2011)
In this study, chess players (n=30) and non-chess players (n=30),
aged 20–50 years, were administered the Tower of London with a time
3 Studies with experimental treatments were not included. See Sala and Gobet (2016)
for a meta-analytic review of studies having incorporated an experimental chess
treatment.
4 Themeasures of cognitive ability included in the presentmeta-analysis are varied, but
the majority correlate moderately or strongly with general intelligence. For example, the
approximate correlation between full-scale IQ and Raven's Progressive Matrices is 0.80
(Jensen, 1998); between full-scale IQ and mental rotation is 0.41 (Ozer, 1987); between
full-scale IQ and block-tapping is 0.38 (Orsini, 1994); between full-scale IQ and the Tower
of London is 0.46 (Morice & Delahunty, 1996); between the SAT and the Cognitive Reflec-
tion Test is 0.44 (Frederick, 2005); between full-scale IQ and perseverative errors in Wis-
consin Card Sorting Task is−0.30 (Ardila, Pineda, & Rosselli, 2000); and, between full-
scale IQ and 2-choice processing speed tasks is 0.41 (Vernon, 1983).
5 To account for effect sizes from dependent samples, we adjusted (i.e., lowered) the
weight of such samples using themethod designed by Cheung and Chan (2004). For a list
of the adjusted Ns, see the data file openly available at https://osf.io/t3uk2/.
Table 1
The descriptive features of the seven included studies.
Study Variable Test Age Rating Control group matching
Anderson
(2004)
Processing speed d2 Test of Attention 11–14 Unranked Age and level of
education
Campitelli and
Labollita
(2016)
Planning; cognitive reflection Tower of London; cognitive
reflection test
15–55;
M = 27.8
(9.70)
Ranked (Elo):
2159–2607; M = 2405.4
(122.0)
Age and level of
education
Doll and Mayr
(1987)
Numerical; verbal; figural intelligence; processing
speed; memory; creativity; information processing
capacity
Berlin Intelligence Structure 18–51;
M = 25.7
(4.9)
Ranked (Elo):
2220–2425; M = 2301.1
(54.3)
Age
Hänggi et al.
(2014)
Fluid intelligence; mental rotation ability; visuospatial
short-term memory
RAPM; V&K; block-tapping
test
19–41;
M = 28.9
(6.02)
Ranked (Elo):
2187–2560; M = 2366
(107)
Age and level of
education
Unterrainer et
al. (2006)
Planning; fluid intelligence; verbal working memory;
visuospatial short-term memory
Tower of London; SPM; digit
span; Corsi block-tapping test
M = 29.3
(8.6)
Ranked (DWZa):
1250–2100;
M = 1683.32
Age and level of
education
Unterrainer et
al. (2011)
Planning Tower of London 20–50;
M = 32.9
(9.1)
Ranked (DWZa):
1209–2303; M = 1808.6
(272.8)
Age, level of education,
and general intelligence
Vidaurreta
(2011)
Problem-solving WCST 7–11 Unranked Age and level of
education
a DWZ (Deutsche Wertungszahl) is the German equivalent of Elo rating.
6 Note that the chess players received a compensation equivalent toUS$12,whereas the
non-chess players received unit credits valid for academic courses.
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constraint. The chess rating range was 1209–2303. The chess players
and non-chess players were matched on age, level of education, and
general intelligence.7
2.3.7. Vidaurreta (2011)
In this study, chess players (n=22) and non-chess players (n=22),
aged 7–11 years, were administered the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task
(WCST).8 This test measures problem-solving and the ability to adapt
to changing rules. Probably due to the young age of the participants,
no measure of chess skill was available. The chess players were from a
local chess club. The chess players and non-chess players werematched
on age and years of education.
2.4. Effect size
The standardized mean difference (Cohen's d) in cognitive ability
scores between the chess players and non-chess players was used as
the effect size. The effect sizes were then corrected for attenuation due
to measurement unreliability (Schmidt & Hunter, 2015) by using the
two following formulas:
d0 ¼ d
a
ð1Þ
Se0 ¼ Se
a
ð2Þ
where d′ is the corrected Cohen's d, Se′ the corrected standard error
(Se), and a the square root of the reliability coefficient (see the data
file openly available at https://osf.io/t3uk2/ for a list of the coefficients
and corrected effect sizes and standard errors). Finally, the Comprehen-
sive Meta-Analysis (Version 3.0; Biostat, Englewood, NJ) and Metafor
(Viechtbauer, 2010) software packages were used for conducting the
meta-analytic, publication bias, and outlier analyses.
3. Results
3.1. Main model
The random-effects meta-analytic overall effect size wasd=0.49, CI
[0.26; 0.72], k=19, p b 0.001. The forest plot is shown in Fig. 2. The I2—a
statistic that specifies the percentage of between-study variability in ef-
fect sizes due to heterogeneity rather than random error—was 66.56.
To evaluate whether any effect size exerted a strong effect on the
meta-analytic overall effect size, we performed a one-study-removed
analysis (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009; Kepes,
McDaniel, Brannick, & Banks, 2013). This analysis showed that themax-
imum difference between the overall effect size (d=0.49) and the sev-
eral point estimates (min: d = 0.45, CI [0.22; 0.67]; max: d = 0.53, CI
[0.31; 0.76]; Fig. 3) was small (±0.04 standard deviations).
3.2. Outlier analysis
To test whether some effect sizes had an unusually large influence
on the overall results, Viechtbauer and Cheung's (2010) outlier detec-
tion analysis was performed. No outliers were found.
3.3. Publication bias analysis
Publication bias occurs when studies with small samples and small
effect sizes are systematically suppressed from the literature. To investi-
gate whether our results were affected by publication bias, we exam-
ined a contour-enhanced funnel plot (Peters, Sutton, Jones, Abrams, &
Rushton, 2008) depicting the relation between effect size and standard
error, and performed Duval and Tweedie's (2000) trim-and-fill analysis.
In the presence of publication bias, effect sizes aremissing from the bot-
tom left part of the funnel plot (small effect sizes with high standard
error). That is, when standard error is high, larger-than-average effects
sizes (those on the bottom right) are more likely to be published than
smaller-than-average effect sizes (those on the bottom left). The trim-
and-fill analysis estimates the number of missing studies from the fun-
nel plot and imputes the missing effect sizes based on the observed
data's asymmetry to create a more symmetrical funnel plot.
The funnel plot was approximately symmetrical around the meta-
analytic mean (d= 0.49; Fig. 4), suggesting no presence of publication
bias. The trim-and-fill analysis estimated nomissing smaller-than-aver-
age effect sizes either left or right of the mean.
Cumulative meta-analysis (Borenstein et al., 2009; Schmidt &
Hunter, 2015) showed that the small-N effect sizes did not sensibly af-
fect the overall effect size, suggesting no presence of publication bias
(Fig. 5).
7 While the groupswerematchedon general intelligence, an additionalmeasure of cog-
nitive ability was administered (Tower of London) and thuswe included it. Given the pat-
tern of results—chess players tending to have higher intelligence than non-chess
players—it is likely that our overall effect size would be larger had the study authors not
matched the chess players and non-chess players on general intelligence.
8 Perseverative errors score is the only measure from the WCST correlating with mea-
sures of full-scale IQ (see Ardila, Pineda, & Rosselli, 2000). Thus, only the data concerning
perseverative errors were used to extrapolate an effect size.
Fig. 2. Forest plot of themainmodel. Cohen's ds (circles) and 95% CIs (lines) are shown for all the effects entered into the meta-analysis. The ds are sorted bymagnitude (from smallest to
largest). The diamond at the bottom indicates the meta-analytically weighted mean d. When studies used multiple outcomemeasures, the plot indicates the result of eachmeasure (M1,
M2, etc.) separately. These effect sizes were adjusted for dependent samples (see footnote 5).
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Fig. 5. Forest plot of the cumulative meta-analysis. The effect sizes are sorted by adjusted Ns (from largest to smallest).
Fig. 4. Contour-enhanced funnel plot of standard errors and effect sizes (ds). The black circles represent the effect sizes included in the meta-analysis. Contour lines are at 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels of statistical significance.
Fig. 3. Forest plot of the one-study-removed analysis. Each row reports the overall effect size (with 95% CI and p-value) that themodelwould estimate if the effect size of the corresponding
study were removed from the analysis.
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Finally, using multiple methods for the detection of publication bias
is important to test the robustness of results (Kepes &McDaniel, 2015).
We thus ran two additional publication bias analyses: (a) selection
models (moderate two-tailed selection and severe two-tailed
selection;9 Vevea & Woods, 2005); and (b) PET-PEESE (Stanley &
Doucouliagos, 2014). The results of the two analyses showed either
minimal differences between the overall effect size (d= 0.49) and the
point estimates, or non-significant point estimate (PET-PEESE). All the
results are summarized in Table 2.
3.4. Additional meta-analytic models
Doll andMayr (1987)was the only study not controlling for the level
of education of the participants. Thus, we ran a random-effects meta-
analytical model without the effect sizes extracted from that study.
The random-effects meta-analytic overall effect size was d = 0.38, CI
[0.10; 0.66], k = 12, p = 0.009. The degree of heterogeneity was I2 =
60.41. One-study-removed analysis showed that the maximum differ-
ence between the overall effect size (d=0.38) and the several point es-
timates (min:d=0.29, CI [0.05; 0.53];max:d=0.44, CI [0.16; 0.72]; Fig.
6) was small (−0.09 standard deviations). Consistent with the one-
study-removed analysis, Viechtbauer and Cheung's (2010) outlier de-
tection analysis found no outliers.
With regard to publication bias analyses, the pattern of results was
similar to the main model, that is small differences between the overall
effect sizes and the point estimate (PET-PEESE point estimateswere still
not significant). All the results are summarized in Table 3, while cumu-
lative meta-analysis is shown in Fig. 7.
Finally, four studies (i.e., Doll & Mayr, 1987; Campitelli & Labollita,
2016; Hänggi et al., 2014; Unterrainer et al., 2006) reported statistically
dependent effect sizes (k= 16). To evaluate whether those effect sizes
meaningfully affected the overall effect size, we calculated theweighted
average effect sizes for three of these studies, while, for Doll and Mayr
(1987), we used the reported full-scale measure of the BIS (see
Section 2.3 and Table 1). We thus inserted the merged effect sizes in a
new meta-analytic model. The random-effects meta-analytic overall
9 The two-tailed selectionswere preferred over the one-tailed selections because of the
particular features of the studies included in this meta-analysis. In fact, several studies
used the data analyzed here as control variables (e.g., Hänggi et al., 2014), or tried to sup-
port the null hypothesis (i.e., no significant difference between chess players and non-
chess players; Unterrainer et al., 2011). Moreover, some studies reported more than one
variable regardless of the significance of the outcomes (e.g., Doll & Mayr, 1987). Thus,
there is no reason to think that high p-values were more likely to be suppressed from
the literature (as assumed by one-tailed selections).
Table 2
Meta-analytic and publication bias outcomes.
Meta-analysis Publication bias analyses
N k d 95% CI 80% Cr. I Q I
2 τ osr t&f smm sms PET PEESE
485 19 0.49 0.26, 0.72 0.00, 1.09 53.82 66.56 0.17 0.45, 0.53, 0.50 0.49 0.47 0.40 0.91 (0.28) 0.65 (0.35)
Note.N=number of the participants; k=number of the effect sizes;d=randomeffectsmeta-analyticmean; 95% CI=95% confidence intervals; 80% Cr. I=80% credibility intervals;Q=
weighted sum of square deviations from themean; I2=ratio of true heterogeneity; τ=between-sample standard deviation; osr= one-sample removed:minimum,maximum, andme-
dian overall effect sizes; t&f= trim-and-fill; smm= two-tailed moderate selection model; sms = two-tailed moderate selection model; PET=precision effect test (one-tailed p-value in
brackets); PEESE= precision effect estimate with standard error (one-tailed p-value in brackets).
Fig. 6. Forest plot of the one-study-removed analysiswithout Doll andMayr (1987). Each row reports the overall effect size (with 95% CI and p-value) that themodelwould estimate if the
effect size of the corresponding study were removed from the analysis. The ds are sorted by magnitude (from smallest to largest).
Table 3
Meta-analytic and publication bias outcomes (without Doll & Mayr, 1987).
Meta-analysis Publication bias analyses
N k d 95% CI 80% Cr. I Q I
2 τ osr t&f smm sms PET PEESE
370 12 0.38 0.10, 0.66 −0.18, 0.93 27.79 60.41 0.15 0.29, 0.44, 0.39 0.44a 0.35 0.30 0.35 (0.33) 0.08 (0.34)
Note.N=number of the participants; k=number of the effect sizes;d=randomeffectsmeta-analyticmean; 95% CI=95% confidence intervals; 80% Cr. I=80% credibility intervals;Q=
weighted sum of square deviations from themean; I2=ratio of true heterogeneity; τ=between-sample standard deviation; osr= one-sample removed:minimum,maximum, andme-
dian overall effect sizes; t&f=trim-and-fill; smm=two-tailedmoderate selectionmodel; sms=two-tailedmoderate selectionmodel; PET=precision effect test (its one-tailed p-value in
brackets); PEESE= precision effect estimate with standard error (its one-tailed p-value in brackets).
a One effect size filled right of the mean. No missing effect sizes left of the mean.
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effect size was slightly smaller but still significant, d = 0.39, CI [0.06;
0.73], k= 7, p= 0.022. Due to scarcity of the effect sizes, no additional
analysis was performed for this model.
4. Discussion
Ericsson (2014) argued that observed differences in cognitive ability
between experts and non-experts are likely due to academic selection
processes. That is, thosewhohave higher cognitive ability aremore like-
ly to become experts because admission tests limit opportunities for
thosewith lower cognitive ability to enter the field and receive training.
Chess does not use academic selection mechanisms, which makes it an
ideal domain to test whether cognitive ability differences emerge with-
out the presence of confounding access limitations. We analyzed the
performance of chess players compared to non-chess players in cogni-
tive abilities related to general intelligence. The results demonstrated
that chess players' overall cognitive ability is higher than age-matched
comparison groups (d = 0.49, p b 0.001). Importantly, the difference
in cognitive ability between chess players and non-chess players does
not seem to be due to level of education, because this variable was con-
trolled for in almost all the reviewed studies. When the only study not
controlling for level of education (i.e., Doll & Mayr, 1987) was excluded
from the analysis, the overall effect size remained significant (d=0.38,
p=0.009). Thus, we found no evidence for Ericsson's (2014) claim that
expert vs. non-expert differences in cognitive ability only reflect ability-
related differences in access to training opportunities.
This finding, combined with the results of Burgoyne et al. (2016), a
meta-analysis that found a significant positive correlation between
chess skill and cognitive ability, provides evidence in favour of the
idea that cognitive ability, to some extent, accounts for the acquisition
of chess skill. Given that deliberate practice appears to be necessary,
but not sufficient, to achieve high levels of expert performance in
chess (Campitelli & Gobet, 2011; Hambrick et al., 2014), it is important
to identify what other factors influence expertise acquisition in chess.
4.1. What is the size of the “True Effect?”
The advantage of chess players in overall cognitive ability remains
statistically significant in all themeta-analyticmodels. However, the es-
timation of the effect size ranges betweend=0.49 (i.e., the effect size of
the main model) and d= 0.30 (i.e., the point estimate from the severe
selection model without Doll & Mayr, 1987): a not negligible difference
of 0.19 standard deviations.
Evaluating themost likely estimate of the effect size dependsmainly
on the reliability of the results of Doll and Mayr (1987). Unfortunately,
not enough informationwas provided to verifywhether the educational
level of the participants affected the results. If we assume that Doll and
Mayr's (1987) results are trustworthy, then the probablemean estimate
lies between 0.49 and 0.40 (the effect size of the main model and its
smallest point estimate from publication bias analysis, respectively). If
we assume that these results are unreliable, then the mean estimate is
reasonably between 0.44 (i.e., the estimation of the trim-and-fill analy-
sis) and 0.35 (i.e., the estimation of the two-tailed moderate selection
model).10 Either way, the size of the effect representing the superiority
of chess players over non-chess players in overall cognitive ability ap-
pears to be approximatively medium (Cohen, 1988).
4.2. Limitations of the study
The total numbers of effect sizes (k=19) and studies (n=7; n=6
without Doll &Mayr, 1987) are relatively small. For this reason, the out-
come of the study, although statistically significant, must be interpreted
with caution. In addition, although chess players outperformed non-
chess players in almost all the reviewed cases, regardless of the partici-
pants' age and type of cognitive ability measured, the limited number of
studies and effect sizes prevented us from testing formoderating effects
of age and type of ability. For example, the difference between chess
players and non-chess players may be more pronounced in youth
than in adulthood (or vice versa). Moreover, this meta-analysis esti-
mates an overall effect size from indicators of different cognitive abili-
ties. In fact, the moderate degree of heterogeneity between effect sizes
(I2 = 66.56) indicates that the distribution is sufficiently homogenous
to be aggregated in the same model (see footnote 4). Thus, the results
support the hypothesis that chess players tend to have higher overall
cognitive ability, but little can be inferred about the difference between
chess players and non-chess players in particular cognitive abilities. For
example, chess playersmay excel only in specific cognitive abilities (e.g.,
visuospatial ability, working memory) but not in measures of verbal
reasoning. Additionally, it is yet to be determined whether the differ-
ence between chess players' and non-chess players' cognitive ability is
stronger when non-chess players are compared to chess experts
(Elo N 2000) andmasters (Elo N 2200), or to amateurs and intermediate
players.
Finally, our results specifically speak to the domain of chess. It is pos-
sible that the academic selection hypothesis holds in other intellectual
domains. However, our results indicate that, at aminimum, the academ-
ic selection hypothesis does not hold for chess and therefore cannot be
generalized to all intellectual domains. Future research is needed to test
10 The value providedby the severe two-tailed selectionmodel (i.e., 0.30) is very likely to
be an underestimation. First, the trim-and-fill analysis found a missing study right of the
mean (point estimate 0.44), which means the overall meta-analytic mean (d = 0.38)
may be an underestimation rather than an overestimation. Second, as mentioned in foot-
note 9, the assumption that non-significant effect sizes––especially the oneswith p-values
between 0.10 and 0.90––have been systematically suppressed from the literature is prob-
ably wrong. For these reasons, we consider the moderate selection model point estimate
(i.e., 0.35)more reliable than the severe selectionmodel one and sufficiently conservative.
Fig. 7. Forest plot of the cumulative meta-analysis without Doll and Mayr (1987). The effect sizes are sorted by adjusted Ns (from largest to smallest).
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whether the academic selection hypothesis accurately reflects expertise
in any domain.
4.3. Recommendations for future research and conclusions
Asmentioned above, the number of studies comparing chess players
to non-chess players on cognitive skills is quite small. Additional studies
are needed that compare chess players of different ages and ratings to
matched non-chess players on a variety of cognitive tests. A larger num-
ber of studies examining variables such as level of skill, the age of
players, and a broad range of cognitive abilities would allow us to test
more sophisticated models and hypotheses.
Based on the available evidence,we demonstrated that chess players
tend to perform better than non-chess players onmeasures of cognitive
ability. Consequently, cognitive ability is a strong candidate to play an
important role, together with deliberate practice, in skill acquisition in
chess. Contrary to Ericsson's (2014) hypothesis, this difference in cogni-
tive ability cannot be explained by academic selection processes, be-
cause no such processes operate in chess. As previously mentioned,
deliberate practice alone is insufficient to account for differences in
chess skill among chess players (Campitelli & Gobet, 2011; Hambrick
et al., 2014). In line with that finding, this study suggests that cognitive
abilitymay also play an important role. To determinewhether the effect
found in this study goes above and beyond the effect of deliberate prac-
tice on chess skill, studies should follow Bilalić et al.'s (2007) recom-
mendation of measuring both deliberate practice and general abilities.
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